What Tor protects (and what it doesn't)
- Protects: your IP from the destination, the destination IP from your ISP. Hides which sites you visit. Hides timing/volume from passive network observers.
- Doesn't protect: what you submit on a form, your browser fingerprint, login cookies, anything tied to a previously KYC'd identity. Doesn't hide that you use Tor from your ISP — they see encrypted Tor traffic. Use a bridge if the latter matters.
- Doesn't protect from exit-node TLS strip on non-HTTPS sites — always check the lock icon.
Setup checklist (safest → easiest)
- Tor Browser. Download from torproject.org. Don't install plugins, don't resize the window, leave the Security Level at "Standard" unless you know why you'd change it.
- Bridge if your ISP blocks Tor. Use obfs4 / WebTunnel / Snowflake bridges from bridges.torproject.org.
- Onion mirrors when offered. Use the .onion address of services you're visiting — keeps the entire circuit inside the Tor network and avoids exit-node trust. xmr.club's onion audit verifies operator-published mirrors.
- Stagger fingerprints. Don't log in to KYC'd accounts in the same session as no-KYC ones. Use a separate Tor Browser instance (different data directory) per identity.
Wallets + Tor
- Cake / Monerujo / Feather all have a "use Tor" toggle that routes wallet RPC through your local Tor daemon. Use it.
- Remote node over Tor — pair the wallet with a public XMR remote node on its .onion address. /nodes lists vetted options with Tor mirrors.
- Don't run your wallet alongside a clearnet browser session on the same machine if you care about correlation — VMs / different devices for serious threat models.
Common pitfalls
- Enabling JavaScript everywhere. JS expands fingerprint surface enormously. Tor Browser Safest disables it; flip categories on per site as needed.
- Login = identity link. Logging into the same email/X/GitHub via Tor and clearnet over time links the two. Use single-purpose accounts.
- Browser window resize. Tor Browser pads window size to a common bucket; resizing breaks that. Don't.
- Bookmarking onion URLs without verification. Verify each onion with the verification guide before relying on it.
- Trusting an exit node. An exit node sees plaintext to the destination over HTTP. Always HTTPS, or always onion-only.
When you actually want a VPN instead
Tor isn't the only privacy tool. If your threat model is "ISP / employer / coffee-shop network", a no-KYC VPN may be enough and is much faster. If it's "state-level adversary" or "publisher's identity protection", Tor is the floor. Many users run Tor over a VPN; that hides Tor usage from the ISP at the cost of trusting the VPN. VPN picks →